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Abstract: This paper aims to comprehend the auditor’s responsibility in connection 
with discovering fraud and discuss the framework adopted in auditing standards. The 
responsibility for detecting fraud is arguably the most significant issue causing the 
expectation gap. Although auditors had direct responsibility for fraud detection in 
earlier periods of the auditing profession, this responsibility disappeared later on 
audit standards. The disappearance may result from an increase of institutional 
complexity faced by auditors, and thus standard setters may be finally on the favor of 
the auditors, compared to wider public interests. Standard setters attempt to help 
auditors by providing a model of fraud risk identification and assessment to assist 
with fraud detection in auditing standards. However, numerous empirical studies also 
find that the model does not help auditors in practice. Notwithstanding the expectation 
gap, a series of accounting scandals and fraud is a test for the effectiveness of the 
model. Otherwise, it may need to set back a greater auditors’ responsibility for 
detecting fraud, which is somehow impossible. 
 
Keywords : Auditor's responsibility, Fraud detection, model of fraud risk 
identification 
Abstrak : Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk memahami tanggung jawab auditor sehubungan 
dengan menemukan kecurangan dan mendiskusikan kerangka yang diadopsi dalam 
standar audit. Tanggung jawab untuk mendeteksi penipuan bisa dibilang masalah 
paling signifikan yang menyebabkan kesenjangan harapan. Meskipun auditor 
memiliki tanggung jawab langsung untuk mendeteksi penipuan pada periode awal 
profesi audit, tanggung jawab ini kemudian hilang pada standar audit. Hilangnya 
dapat terjadi akibat peningkatan kompleksitas kelembagaan yang dihadapi oleh 
auditor, dan dengan demikian penentu standar pada akhirnya dapat menguntungkan 
auditor, dibandingkan dengan kepentingan publik yang lebih luas. Penyusun standar 
berusaha membantu auditor dengan menyediakan model identifikasi dan penilaian 
risiko penipuan untuk membantu mendeteksi penipuan dalam standar audit. Namun, 
banyak studi empiris juga menemukan bahwa model tersebut tidak membantu auditor 
dalam praktiknya. Meskipun kesenjangan harapan, serangkaian skandal akuntansi 
dan kecurangan adalah ujian untuk keefektifan model. Jika tidak, mungkin perlu 
menetapkan tanggung jawab auditor yang lebih besar untuk mendeteksi penipuan, 
yang entah bagaimana tidak mungkin. 
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1. Introduction 
A series of accounting scandals has been damaged the public trust in business 
around the world. The nine scandals (Enron, Lehman Brothers, Citigroup, Tyco, 
WorldCom, Qwest, and Global Crossing, Parmalat, Satyam) are widely blamed as the 
most extreme examples of corporate destruction in this century and the beginning of 
the severe economic and financial crisis (Grove and Basilico, 2011). These companies 
experienced massive frauds and accounted for total market capitalization losses of 
US$714 billion, with the highest record for Citigroup (US$240 billion) and 
WorldCom and Enron losing around US$ 180 billion and US$70 billion respectively 
(Zabihollah, 2005; Grove & Basilico, 2011). WorldCom capitalized its expenses by 
US$3 billion and US$797 million in 2001 and the first quarter of 2002, respectively, 
to increase the company's profit and key managers at Tyco committed fraud on 
unauthorized loans (Clarke, 2005). KPMG (2003) reveals that the likelihood of fraud 
occurring in companies increased by more than 40% from 1998 to 2003. Also, PwC 
surveyed 3,000 company officers in 2005 and found a similar pattern that the 
trend of committing fraud was even higher (140%) after the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. Besides financial losses, the fall of Enron caused 
the laying off of thousands of employees in 40 countries, the collapse of Arthur 
Anderson, one of the Big 5 firms of accountants, and rocketing energy prices, and led 
to an erosion of trust (Albrecht, Albrecht, Albrecht, & Zimbelman, 2009). 
After the collapse of Enron, the US government enacted the SOX as a response to 
the series of financial and accounting malpractices. Standard setters of auditing also 
issued or renewed standards on auditing which put more responsibility on 
management and auditors to prevent and detect fraud. The American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in 2002 issued Statement on Auditing 
Standards (SAS) No.99 (superseding SAS 82): Consideration of Fraud in Financial 
Statement Audit. The issuance followed by the UK’s Auditing Practices Board (APB) 
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with International Standards on Auditing (ISA) No. 240 (superseding SAS 110): The 
Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in Audit of Financial Statements in 2004, 
and International Federation of Accountants (hereafter, IFAC) with its ISA No. 240 in 
2004 which has same title with UK auditing standards. IFAC (2011) reports that 125 
countries also acted in similar ways by strengthening the rules of corporate 
governance and improving auditing standards1. In a similar vein, the Indonesian 
Institute of Accountants (hereafter the IAI, in Indonesian stands for Ikatan Akuntan 
Indonesia) through a national accounting convention in 2004 has decided to move 
closer to international accounting and auditing standards – International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) and ISA – to prevent and deter fraud. 
 
2. Theoretical Review 
2.1  Modern History of Corporate Fraud 
The literature documents that the Vereenidge Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) 
or the Dutch East Indies Company was the first share issuer to go public in 1602 at the 
Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange (bourse), which was the first stock exchange in the world founded in 
1602. The VOC was the first multinational company, and the Dutch Government 
granted the right for VOC to monopolize Asian trade. For this purpose, the VOC 
empowered itself by building forts, establishing armies, and signing treaties with the 
Asian countries. The firm used the army to maintain its monopoly and constructed a 
central commander at Batavia (now Jakarta, Indonesia) to manage trading activities 
and later as a colonial camp in the Asian area. It earned huge profits from the trade of 
rempah-rempah (spice) which was planted and harvested mostly from around Maluku 
Island (eastern part of Indonesia) and brought to Europe. At that time, VOC’s 
accounting period was for ten years duration, and the company only produced 
financial statements twice in its existence as a company (Sarna, 2010). The VOC’s 
success continued until the late 1800s when it started to decline because of the 
emergence of British companies in Asia and Vergaan Onder Corruptie (translated as, 
perished under corruption) by its employees. 
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VOC’s defeat in several wars against British companies caused negative 
consequences. Besides disrupting the traffic of VOC’s ships between Asia and 
Europe, the wars reduced VOC’s market share and competitive advantage in Asia as 
well as in Europe. While the firm faced much pressure from the defeat and 
competition, employees had to serve for company’s interest. It encouraged them, 
especially who worked far away from Netherland, used their power to make gains at 
the expense of the company (Nierstrasz, 2008). For instance, they used forced labors 
(slavery) in the production of spices in Indonesia to enrich themselves, rather than to 
send the commodities and cash resulted from illegal tax (upeti) to the Netherlands. 
This kind of fraud spread out the company and led it to bankruptcy. A series of 
corporate fraud cases follows corruption in VOC, and it continues up to recent frauds 
as introduced in the previous section. 
 
2.2. Auditors’ Responsibility for Fraud Detection 
After revelations of undetected fraud in the past until the recent days, the question 
is raised of, “Where were the auditors?” (Humphrey, Turley, and Moizer, 1993; 
Cullinan and Sutton, 2002; Hassink, Bollen, Meuwissen, and Vries, 2009). The issue 
is unlikely to be resolved by the profession of auditor concerning auditor 
responsibility to detect fraud when conducting audit, and it is indicated by an 
expectation gap between what the public perceives about the auditor can do and what 
auditor actually does (Humphrey et al., 1993; Cullinan and Sutton, 2002; Hassink et 
al., 2009). Humphrey et al. (1993) state the profession intentionally avoids taking 
responsibility for detecting fraud by deflecting criticism. For example, the costs 
(staffs/auditors, expenses/budget, and time) of detecting fraud may be higher than the 
benefits resulting from it (Humphrey, et al. 1993; Hudson, 2007). Also, the growth of 
multinational companies and the increase in transaction volumes may cause difficulty 
for auditors to detect fraud and ensure that financial statements are free from material 
misstatement (Humphrey et al., 1993). 
The beginning of the debate on auditors’ responsibility can be traced back to the 
1800s when auditing textbook, Auditing – A Practical Manual for Auditors in Britain, 
Suyanto 
 
135 
 
mentioned fraud detection as a primary objective of audit, as well as in the US in 1912 
with the first American textbook on auditing, Auditing Theory and Practice by Robert 
Montgomery (Lisa, 2010). For instance, Dicksee (1912) described the objective of an 
audit as follows: 
 
The object of an audit may be said to be threefold: 
1. The detection of fraud [emphasis added] 
2. The detection of technical errors 
3. The detection of errors of principle… 
…the detection of fraud is a most important portion of the auditor's 
duties. Auditors, therefore, should assiduously cultivate this branch of 
their activities. (Dicksee, 1912, pp. 7-8). 
 
However, the responsibility for detecting fraud started to disappear from 
statements of auditing standards by the 1940s, and the client began to take over the 
duty from the auditor (Humphrey et al., 1993). The Benson Report (still in Humphrey 
et al., 1993) supported this disappearance by arguing that the auditor should protect 
client’s information confidentially and not disclose it to other parties, except as the 
standard requires to do so and it should be first communicated to the client. Regulators 
and the profession seem to favor this stance. 
In response to fraud, the audit profession has attempted to improve auditing 
standards. According to International Standards on Auditing (ISA) 2402, an objective 
of financial statement audit is to provide an opinion on whether the financial 
statements fairly stated following generally accepted accounting principles. Fairness 
of financial statements means that they do not contain material misstatement resulting 
from either errors or frauds. Auditors have to be aware of material misstatements, 
especially due to fraud, since it is more challenging to detect misstatement due to 
fraud than errors. ISA 240 notes the auditor responsibility is: (i) to identify and assess 
the risks of material misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud; (ii) to 
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obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence regarding the assessed risks; and (iii) to 
respond appropriately to fraud or suspected fraud during the audit.  
ISA 240, however, does not provide detailed guidance on how to implement these 
responsibilities on audit procedures. Ramos (2003) argues that standards do not 
include this because of predictability of audit procedures will help perpetrators to 
conceal fraudulent activities and go undetected and, for that reason, the standards only 
provide cues to use such surprise audit procedures. 
KPMG (2003) finds that fraud discovery by external auditor relatively diminished 
after the enactment of US SAS 82 of 1998 from 5% in 1994 to 4% in 1998 and 
increased again to the level of 12% in 2003 after promulgation of US SAS 99 of 
20023. The same survey conducted KPMG in 2009 reveals that even though the US 
SAS 99 provides aid at the beginning, it is less effective in the following years as 
indicated by a decrease in the number of fraud detection by auditors (9% in 2009). 
Consistent with this finding, Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) (2008, 
2010, 2016) confirms that auditors’ ability to detect corporate fraud has decreased 
from 12% (2006) to 9.1% (2008) to 4.6% (2010)4. Also, by studying juror perceptions 
regarding auditor’s responsibility for detecting fraud under US SAS 99, Lisa (2010) 
notes that even though auditors are more responsible under SAS 99, auditors less feel 
guilty when they do not discover fraud in their audit. These studies assert that the 
auditing standards on fraud may only provide a little help for auditor in detecting fraud 
and, because of it, the expectation gap arguably still exists. 
 
2.3   US Auditing Standards on Fraud 
In the US, the Auditing Standards Board (ASB), previously known as the 
Committee on Auditing Procedures (1939-1972) and the Auditing Standards 
Executive Committee (1972-1978), of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) is the standard setter who issues Statement on Auditing 
Standards (SAS). The responsibility of auditors in the US in respect of fraud was 
mentioned in the first auditing standards in the 1970s with SAS 1 Section 110 
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(1972), superseded by SAS 16 (1977), replaced by SAS 53 (1988), replaced by SAS 
82  
(1997), later superseded by SAS 99 (2002) as in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. 
List of Fraud-Related Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 
 
Year Statement Number Title 
1973 1 Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures 
1977 16 The Independent Auditor's Responsibility 
1988 53 
The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and Report 
Errors and 
  Irregularities 
1997 82 
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit 
2002 99 
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit 
 
SAS  1 consisted of several sections and bundled them as one package, including The 
responsibility of the auditor for detecting fraud (see Section 110). SAS 1 was 
originally from Statement on Auditing Procedures (SAP) No. 33-54 which were in the 
pamphlet forms in the Journal of Accountancy and issued by the Committee on 
Auditing Procedure from 1939 to 1972 
Concerning auditor responsibility for detecting fraud, 
SAS 1 Section 110 para. 05, Detection of Fraud notes: 
...the independent auditor is aware of the possibility that fraud may exist…The 
auditor recognizes that fraud, if sufficiently material, may affect his opinion on 
the financial statements, and his examination, made following generally accepted 
auditing standards, considers this possibility. However, the ordinary examination 
directed to the expression of an opinion on the financial statement is not primarily 
or specifically designed, and cannot be relied upon, to disclose defalcations and 
other similar irregularities, although their discovery may result…. The 
responsibility of the independent auditor for failure to detect fraud (which 
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responsibility differs as to clients and others) arises only when such failure 
clearly results from failure to comply with generally accepted auditing standards. 
 
SAS 16 para. 5, The Independent Auditor's Responsibility notes: 
The independent auditor's objective in examining the financial statement 
following generally accepted auditing standards is to form an opinion on whether 
the financial statements present fairly financial position, results of operations, and 
changes in financial position in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles consistently applied. Consequently, under generally accepted auditing 
standards  the independent auditor has the responsibility, within the inherent 
limitations of the auditing process, to plan his examination to search for errors or 
irregularities that would have a material effect on the financial statement and to 
exercise due skill and care in the conduct of that examination. The auditor's 
search for material errors or irregularities ordinarily is accomplished by the 
performance of those auditing procedures that in his judgment are appropriate in 
the circumstances to form an opinion on the financial statements 
SAS  53 para. 5, The Auditor’s Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and 
Irregularities notes: 
 
The auditor should assess the risk that errors and irregularities may cause the 
financial statements to contain a material misstatement. Based on that assessment, 
the auditor should design the audit to provide reasonable assurance of detecting 
errors and irregularities that are material to the financial statements. 
 
Meanwhile, SAS No. 82 and 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit, 
(AICPA, Professional Standards, “Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent 
Auditor”), 
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states: 
The auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable 
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material 
misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud. 
 
2.3   UK Auditing Standards on Fraud 
The authority for issuing auditing standards in the UK is the Auditing Practices 
Board (APB) of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC). The APB was established in 
1991 to replace the  Auditing Practices Committee (APC) that existed since 1976. 
Fraud related auditing standards  in the UK can be traced back to 1995 when the APB 
issued Statement of Auditing Standards  (SAS) No. 110, Fraud and Error. 
International Standards superseded SAS 110 on Auditing (ISA) of APB No. 240 
(2004), and finally superseded by the ISA 240 (2009) with same number and title of 
ISA of 2004, the Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an  Audit of 
Financial Statements. The last two are the same in substance, but the newer one has 
 incorporated the clarified ISAs issued by the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards 
 
Board (IAASB) (APB, 2009). Concerning the responsibility for discovering fraud, 
SAS 110 
Sec. 1, para. 2 states: 
Auditors should plan and perform their audit procedures and evaluate and report 
the results thereof, recognizing that fraud or error may materially affect the 
financial statements. 
 
ISA 240 (UK and Ireland) states: 
An auditor conducting an audit following ISAs (UK and Ireland) is responsible 
for obtaining reasonable assurance that the financial statements taken as a whole 
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are free from material misstatement, whether caused by fraud or error. Owing to 
the inherent limitation of an audit, there is an unavoidable risk that some 
material misstatements of the financial statements may not be detected, even 
though the audit is properly planned and performed following the ISAs (UK and 
Ireland). 
 
2.4  International Standards on Auditing 
At the international level, the Accountants International Study Group started an 
initiative to  form auditing standards in 1969 by studying different practices in 
Canada, UK, and the US. In 1978, the Council of the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) established the International Auditing Practices Committee 
(IAPC), which worked on three key areas: object and scope of audits of financial 
statements; engagement letters; and general auditing guidelines from 1980 to 1991. 
Also, in 1991, the IAPC recodified its auditing guidelines to become International 
Standards on Auditing (ISA). 
The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) was 
founded in 2002 to  replace the IAPC. In 2004, the IAASB started to work on the 
Clarity Project, a program to  update and clarify the ISAs so that the ISAs are more 
understandable and compatible with  regulatory frameworks. 
The first fraud-related standard was issued in March 2001 by the IAPC, ISA No. 
240. After reviewing and obtaining an understanding of revision of US SAS 82, the 
IAASB revised ISA 240 by extending it with the audit risk model and adopting the 
basic principles and essential procedures contained in the US SAS 99. The new ISA 
240 entitled The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial 
Statements, eliminates ‘errors’ from the title. In connection with the auditor’s 
responsibility for discovering fraud, this standard is the same as ISA 240 (UK and 
Ireland). 
2.5  Fraud Taxonomy 
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ACFE (2007) classifies fraud into three categories: corruption; asset 
misappropriation; and fraudulent financial statements (see Figure 1). These frauds are 
usually perpetrated by employees, management, and/or the owners of the business so 
that it is also known as occupational fraud. Meanwhile, accounting standard setters 
group it into two of these types, asset misappropriation and fraudulent financial 
statements (ISA 240, 2009, para. 3; SAS 99, 2002, para. 6). This paper focuses on 
fraud, as promulgated in auditing standards, especially to detect fraudulent financial 
statements. 
Figure 1 
Classification of Occupational Fraud 
2.6  Definition of Fraud and Fraud Triangle 
Fraud has a broad definition depending on the point of views such as economics, law, 
accounting, or psychology. Albrecht et al. (2009) define fraud as: 
 
A generic term, and embraces all the multifarious means which human 
ingenuity can devise, which are resorted to by one individual, to get an 
advantage over another by false representations. No definite and invariable 
rule can be laid down as a general proposition in defining fraud, as it 
includes surprise, trickery, cunning and unfair ways by which another is 
cheated. The only boundaries defining it are those which limit human 
knavery. (p.7). 
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ISA 240 (IFAC, 2016) defines fraud as: 
 
An intentional act by one or more individuals among management, those 
charged with governance, employees, or third parties, involving the use of 
deception to obtain an unjust or illegal advantage. (p.170). 
 
The auditing standards on fraud use the fraud triangle as a framework for auditors 
to detect fraud in an audit of financial statements. Figure 2 illustrates the fraud 
triangle. The origin of the fraud triangle dates Cressey (1953) who interviewed 
inmates convicted of violations of financial trust. 
He noted that perpetrators committed fraud when three conditions existed: 
perceived pressures;  perceived opportunities; and rationalizations or attitudes. 
Perceived pressure is the incentive to commit fraud, and perceived opportunity is 
when conditions allow perpetrators to commit fraud, and rationalization is the 
fraudster's ability to justify the fraud for him or herself. The AICPA and IFAC 
recognize that it only needs one of these factors to exist for perpetrators to commit 
fraud, and therefore, auditors must have professional skepticism when conducting 
their audits. 
Albrecht et al. (2009) provide an illustration of the fraud triangle where pressure 
could be due to financial, vices, work-related, and other reasons. Financial incentives 
include greed, living beyond one’s mean, high bills or personal debt, poor credit, 
personal financial losses, and unexpected financial needs. Vice pressures include 
gambling, drugs, alcohol, and expensive extramarital relationships. Work-related 
issues can also cause pressure such as getting little recognition, job dissatisfaction, 
fearing losing one’s job, being overlooked for a promotion, and feeling underpaid. The 
element of opportunity can be a lack of control, inability to judge the quality of 
performance, failure to discipline fraud perpetrators, a lack of access to information, 
incapacity, and a lack of audit trails. The third element, rationalization, usually uses 
justification to excuse fraudulent activities such as the organization owes it to 
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perpetrators, fraudsters just borrow it and will pay it back, nobody will get hurt, 
fraudsters deserve more, it’s for a good purpose, perpetrators will fix it later after 
getting over this financial difficulty, or something has to be sacrificed. The AICPA 
and IFAC examples of each of the fraud triangle elements and auditors need to be 
sceptical throughout their audits when these conditions exist. 
 
Figure 2 
The Fraud Triangle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Auditing standards provide operational guidance for auditors to identify and 
assess fraud risks (Ramos, 2003)5. Risk assessment complements other procedures for 
detecting fraud such as exercising professional skepticism, holding brainstorming or 
discussion sessions, identifying and assessing the risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud, responding to the assessed risks of material misstatements, and obtaining 
written representations (AICPA 2002; IASB, 2009). 
Prior research on fraud attempts to specify fraud risk factors using financial and 
non-financial data (Persons, 1995; Kaminski et al., 2004; Skousen, 2008, Kirkos et al., 
2007).  Table 2 summarizes fraud risk factors derived from ISA 240 and SAS 99. 
Panel A exhibits Pressures, categorized into financial stability, external pressure, 
personal financial need, and financial targets. Panel B demonstrates Opportunities, 
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grouped into the nature of the industry, ineffective monitoring, and organizational 
structure. The last panel shows Rationalization.  
 
Table 2 
Summary of Risks due to Fraudulent Financial Statements Based Auditing 
Standars  
Panel A: Pressures  
Categories Examples 
Financial Stability - High degree of completion or market saturation 
 
- High   vulnerability   to   rapid   changes   (in   
technology, 
 obsolescence, interest rate) 
 
- High declines in customer demand or increasing business 
failures 
 - Operating losses 
 - Recurring negative cash flows 
 - Rapid growth or unusual profitability 
 - New accounting or regulatory requirements 
External Pressure - Profitability or trend level expectations 
 - Need for obtaining debt or equity financing requirements 
 - Meeting exchange listing requirements 
 - Effects of reporting poor financial results 
Personal Financial Need - Significant financial interests in the firm 
 - Significant portions of management or those charged with 
 governance’s compensation 
 - Personal guarantees of debts of the entity 
Financial Targets Sales or profitability 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Opportunities  
Categories Examples 
Nature of Industry - Significant related-party transactions 
 - Domination in a certain industry 
 
- Accounts which based on high estimates/subjective 
judgments 
 - Significant, unusual, or complex transactions 
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 - Many subsidiaries in abroad 
 - Use of business intermediaries 
Ineffective Monitoring 
-  Domination of management by a single person/small 
group 
 -  Ineffective oversight by those charged with governance 
 -  Inadequate monitoring of controls 
 
-  High turnover rates or employment of accounting/audit 
staff 
 -  Ineffective accounting and information systems 
 
 
Incentives/Pressures 
Panel A illustrates the conditions in which a fraud perpetrator is encouraged to 
commit fraud: uncertainty on financial stability or profitability; excessive external 
pressures; high personal financial need; and excessive pressure to meet financial 
targets. If financial stability is threatened by some factors such as a high degree of 
competition or market saturation, rapid changes in technology, significant decreases 
in customer demand, huge operating losses, or new regulations, firms may be likely 
to manipulate its earnings so that financial stability or profitability changes appear 
smoothly over two or more years or even to engage in fraud. Most of the studies use 
financial ratios as risk factors since the ratios can be useful for detecting fraudulent 
activities (Albretch et al., 2009) and unusual changes in financial ratios may 
indicate an occurrence of fraud (Kaminski et al., 2004). For example, financial 
stability is measured by using capital turnover which reflects the sales are 
generating power of a firm's assets and also management's ability to deal with 
competitive situations (Persons, 1995). Persons (1995) argues that compared to no-
fraud firms, fraud firms may be less competitive in using the firm's assets to 
generate sales. Also, Persons (1995) contends that under competition pressure, if a 
firm is not able to compete successfully, it may encourage management to 
manipulate the financial statements. 
Management also frequently has to meet requirements or expectations from 
external parties such as investment analysts, institutional investors, significant 
creditors, potential investors/creditors, stock exchange requirements, or other third 
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parties. If their requirements or expectations are unrealistic or unachievable for 
management, it fosters management to find an adverse way to approach them. For 
example, leverage is employed to quantify these pressures. Persons (1995) states that 
firms with higher leverage are associated with a higher likelihood of loan agreement 
violation, and they also have less ability to obtain additional funds from borrowing. To 
cope with its need of debt covenant, management is more likely to manipulate 
financial statement (Kirkos et al., 2007). Therefore, financial distress may be an 
indication that management has an incentive to perpetrate fraud (Loebbecke et al., 
1989; Stice, 1991; Kirkos et al., 2007). 
Management or those charged with governance are encouraged to protect their 
personal concerns when their interests such as significant financial matters (bonuses, 
stock options, investments, and others) in the firm are threatened. Beasley (1996) and 
Skousen (2008) state that management tends to do its favor, when its personal interests 
are threatened by firm's financial performance, resulting from management having 
significant financial interests in the entity. 
Also, financial targets such as sales or profits which are established by those 
charged with governance can be pressures for management to engage in fraud. For 
instance, Persons (1995) claims that firms with lower profitability tend to overstate 
revenues or understate expenses. Moreover, Kreutzfeldt and Wallace (1986) and 
Persons (1995) suggest that a firm with lower profitability tends to have significantly 
more errors in its financial statement than a firm with higher profitability. Thus, low 
profitability is an incentive that may foster management to engage in fraud. 
Detail fraud risk factors for Pressure/Incentive which provided by ISA 240 can be 
seen in Appendix. 
Opportunities 
Panel B shows opportunity when fraud exists, including the nature of the industry 
or the entity’s operation, ineffective monitoring of management, complex or unstable 
organizational structure, and weak systems of internal controls. The complete set of 
this guidance is provided in the Appendix. The nature of the industry can adversely 
condition perpetrators to commit fraud. It can be significant related-party transactions, 
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domination in a certain industry sector, accounts which involve significant estimates 
or subjective judgments, unusual or complex transactions, having many overseas 
subsidiaries, and use of business intermediaries. These factors can provide an 
opportunity for fraudsters to engage in fraud. For instance, related party transactions 
are a transaction between a company and an insider, in the form of a subsidiary or 
employee. Carmichael (1999) states this kind of transaction does not reflect arm’s 
length bargaining between independent parties which is a crucial point for revenue 
recognition and if a transaction materially differs from its economic substance, profit 
recognition should generally be deferred. For example, if a firm has established the 
other party and acted as buyer and seller, the general rule is that revenue recognition 
should not be taken into account, even when the transactions were disclosed 
(Carmichael, 1999). In many fraud cases – Enron, Tyco, Qwest, WorldCom, Global 
Crossing, related party transaction is allegedly used to manipulate earnings and 
commit fraud (Young, 2005; Grove and Basilico, 2011). 
Another example of the nature of the industry, especially for companies which 
have significant inventory, changes in inventory. Inventory is one of the easiest 
accounts to manipulate (Stice, 1991; Persons, 1995), since it may involve a subjective 
estimation which makes it more difficult to be audited. Inventory fraud generally 
employs several methods such as valuing inventory at a lower rate and recording 
obsolete inventory (Kirkos et al. 2007). Persons (1995) discovers that fraud firms tend 
to undergo higher inventory/total assets than no-fraud firms. 
Ineffective monitoring, such as the weak system of internal control, domination 
of management by a single or small group, ineffective those charged with governance, 
high turnover rates of employment, and inefficient accounting and information 
systems, frequently facilitates perpetrators to commit fraud. In empirical research, 
some studies use accounting firm size (Big 4 versus Non-Big 4) to measure the effect 
of ineffective monitoring on fraudulent activities. The term ‘Big 4’ (previously, Big 8, 
Big 6 and then Big 5) refers to the four largest international accounting firms (Deloitte 
& Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers). Prior studies show 
that there is a relationship between audit quality and audit-firm size (Palmrose, 1988; 
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DeFond, 1992) and between non-Big 4 audit firms and fraud (Faber; 2005). The Big 4 
tend to have higher audit quality which is indicated by low litigation activities and 
their ability to mitigate agency problems (Palmrose, 1988; Defond, 1992). Another 
finding is that firms in which fraud occurs are more likely to employ a non-Big 4 
rather than a Big 4 auditor (Faber, 2005). Thus, there is a tendency that firms which 
commit fraud will hire non-Big 4 since they perceive that non-Big 4 has lower audit 
quality.  
Opportunities for committing fraud can also be present when the structure of the 
organization is complex or unstable. It is often indicated by unclear organization 
structure, complex organizational structure, and high turnover of senior management, 
legal counsel, or boards of directors. Powerful CEO or insider board influence, for 
instance, always exists in fraud firms (Grove and Basilico, 2011). In a similar vein, 
Loebbecke et al., (1989) state that, in most fraud cases, operating and financial 
decisions were made and dominated by a single person. The absence of power-
counterbalance may provide an opportunity to engage in fraud. 
 
Attitudes/Rationalizations 
The standards as shown in the Panel C supply fraud risk factors as an aid for 
auditors to assess rationalizations which may have been used by perpetrators, such as 
1) ineffective communication, implementation, support, or enforcement of the entity’s 
ethical values, 2) known history of violations of laws, regulation, policy, etc., 3) low 
morale among senior management, and others (see Appendix). These factors are used 
by fraudsters to justify their actions to look legal or be accepted by others. For 
instance, if perpetrators know that a wrongdoer is not punished, then they can 
rationalize their fraud. This component is the most difficult factor for auditors to 
assess (IFAC, 2009), so in such cases, many studies do not attempt to find a 
relationship between fraud and its rationalization (Brazel et al., 2007; Skousen et al., 
2008). Brazel et al. (2007) argue that it is challenging to know an individual's attitude 
or rationalize why fraudsters commit fraud by using public data. However, some of 
them still try to make a connection using relevant data. For instance, management 
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tends to switch its auditors in anticipation of some agency conflict – between the 
managers and the owners (DeFond, 1992). In regards to this change, Schewartz and 
Menon (1985) and Skousen et al. (2008) argue that unhealthy firms tend to change 
their auditors more often than do healthier ones and these failing firms are likely to 
switch to a different class of accounting firms. With these arguments, Chen and Elder 
(2007) show that firms with more frequent auditor changes are more likely to engage 
in financial statement fraud. The auditor switches may be an indication that a company 
has a problem, and therefore, auditors should be aware of this cue. 
A nonfinancial management's excessive participation in the selection of 
accounting policies or determination of significant estimates can also contribute for 
perpetrators to justify their fraudulent activities. Vermeer (2003) and Skousen (2008) 
state that accruals are discretionary for management and it can provide various 
alternatives for management to rationalize its financial reporting in its favor. 
Modification or manipulation of these components could cause an increase or decrease 
of accruals. Thus, the excessive use of discretionary accruals may indicate the 
likelihood of financial statement fraud. 
 
4 Discussion and Conclusion 
As discussed above fraud is a challenging issue, and current auditing standards on 
fraud may be unlikely to help auditors in detecting fraud as shown by reports of ACFE 
from 2008 to 2016 which indicate that auditors' ability to detect fraud seems to 
diminish (ACFE, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016). While institutional complexity faced 
by auditors may be impossible for the auditing profession to set back to auditors’ 
responsibility to detect fraud, the profession seems to do on its favour to avoid legal 
intervention enforcing new audit regulations or adverse court ruling claiming audit 
failures in fraud cases (Buckless and Peace, 1993; Holm et al., 2011). Moreover, 
revising auditing standards on auditor’s responsibility for detecting fraud by self-
regulation body such as the auditing profession is viewed as a part of this effort to 
protect the profession (Holm et al., 2011). Notwithstanding this argument, the 
following section highlights three points concerning fraud risk factors (pressures, 
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opportunities, and rationalizations) as provided in auditing standards and also the 
responsibility of auditor for detecting fraud. 
First, the auditing standards on fraud, in the UK, US, and more than 123 
countries which adopt international standards on auditing, acknowledge that 
management and those charged with governance (especially boards of directors and 
audit committees) have a responsibility to prevent and detect fraud. However, several 
studies find that management and insider board members are individuals who are most 
likely to commit fraud (Cullinan and Sutton, 2002; ACFE, 2008, 2010). Top 
management and/or boards of directors committed fraud in the companies mentioned 
in the introduction. Thus, an independent party such as auditor is the most appropriate 
one to clarify and assess management’s assertions, since auditors have the knowledge 
and competencies. 
Second, ACFE (2010) reveals that the likelihood of fraudulent financial 
statements increases every year, while the discovery of fraud by auditors tends to 
diminish. The findings show that even though the standards give extensive cues of 
risks to aid auditors in detecting fraud, they are unlikely to help auditors detect 
fraudulent activities. Shelton et al. (2001) and Srivastava et al. (2011) state that the 
standard only provides general guidance and the fraud risk assessment approach for 
each accounting firm is different. Also, they also claim that some studies on fraud risk 
assessment, which attempt to combine fraud risk factors from different sources – 
quantitative and qualitative information, are not grounded on a sound theoretical basis 
either for risk assessment or for combination itself. Even when the combination is 
justifiable, a problem still emerges, that is, how to combine multiple information 
sources in a quantifiable and measurable form (Srivastava et al. 2009). 
Finally, the effectiveness of fraud risk assessment based on auditing standards is 
dependent on how to present and conduct the risk assessment. By studying the effect 
of several risk assessment approaches – standard risk checklists versus no checklists 
and standard audit programs versus no programs, Asare, and Wright (2004) find that 
auditors who use a no-checklists and no-programs approach tend to discover the fraud. 
They argue that the use of a standard checklist and a standard audit program impairs 
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auditor abilities to respond to fraud risk. Even though such tools may assist and direct 
auditors, especially junior staff, in detecting fraud, standardized aids can reduce 
auditor's sensitivity to fraud risks. Therefore, it needs a more strategic reasoning 
approach to generate fraud risk awareness (Asare and Wright, 2004). The profession 
has been advancing auditor's responsibility in detecting fraud through auditing 
standards, but they also recognize that the nature of fraud is more difficult to be 
detected than mere errors, and collusion on fraud makes fraud even more difficult to 
be discovered. 
References 
 
ACFE. (2008). Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse Global Fraud Study: 
         ACFE. 
 
ACFE. (2010). Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse Global Fraud Study: 
         ACFE. 
 
ACFE. (2012). Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse Global Fraud Study: 
        ACFE. 
 
ACFE. (2014). Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse Global Fraud Study: 
        ACFE. 
 
ACFE. (2016). Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse Global Fraud Study: 
       ACFE. 
 
AICPA. (1973). Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 1: Codification of Auditing 
Standards and Procedures. 
AICPA. (1977). Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 16: The Independent Auditor's 
Responsibility. 
 
AICPA. (1988). Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 53: The Auditor's Responsibility 
to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities. 
 
AICPA. (1997). Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82: Consideration of Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit. 
 
AICPA. (2002). Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82: Consideration of Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit. 
 
Albrecht, W. S., Albrecht, C. C., Albrecht, C. O., & Zimbelman, M. F. (2009). 
Fraud Examination (3rd ed.). OH USA: South-Western Cengage Learning. 
 
The Indonesian Journal of Accounting Research – May, Vol. 19 , No.2 , 2016 
152 
 
Asare, S. K., & Wright, A. M. (2004). The Effectiveness of Alternative Risk Assessment and 
Program Planning Tools in a Fraud Setting*. Contemporary Accounting Research, 
21(2), 325-352. 
 
Beasley, M. S. (1996). An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Director 
Composition and Financial Statement Fraud. The Accounting Review, 71(4 ), 443-465 
 
Brazel, J. F., Jones, K. L., & Zimbelman, M. F. (2009). Using Nonfinancial Measures to 
Assess Fraud Risk. Journal of Accounting Research, 47(5), 1135-1166. 
 
Carmichael, D. R. (1999). Hocus-Pocus Accounting: Where there's revenue-recognition 
deviation, there could be fraud. Journal of Accountancy, October. 
 
Chen, K. Y., & Elder, R. J. (2008). Fraud Risk Factors and the Likelihood of Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting: Evidence from Statement on Auditing Standards No. 43 in 
Taiwan Paper presented at the American Accounting Association's 2008 Annual 
Meeting Anaheim. 
 
Clarke, T. (2005). Accounting for Enron: shareholder value and stakeholder interests. 
 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(5), 598-612. 
 
Cullinan, C. P. S., Cullinan, C. P., & Sutton, S. G. (2002). Defrauding the public interest: A 
critical examination of reengineered audit processes and the likelihood of detecting 
fraud. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Jun2002, Vol. 13 Issue 3, p297, 14p. 
 
DeFond, M. L. (1992). The Association Between Changes in Client Firm Agency Costs and 
Auditor Switching. Auditing, 11(1), 16-31. 
 
Dicksee, L. R. (1912). Auditing: A Practical Manual for Auditors. London: Gee & Co. 
 
FRC. (2009). International Standards on Auditing (UK and Ireland) No.240: The Auditor’s 
Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements.  
Grove, H., & Basilico, E. (2011). Major Financial Reporting Frauds of the 21st Century: 
Corporate Governance and Risk Lessons Learned Journal of Forensic & Investigative 
Accounting 3(2). 
 
Hassink, H. F. D., Bollen, L. H., Meuwissen, R. H. G., & de Vries, M. J. (2009). 
Corporate fraud and the audit expectations gap: A study among business managers. 
Journal of International Accounting, Auditing, and Taxation, 18(2), 85-100. 
 
Hodson, N. M. (2007). Why Auditors Don’t Find Fraud In J. O’Brien (Ed.), Private Equity, 
Corporate Governance and the Dynamics of Capital Market Regulation (pp. 179-212). 
London Imperial College Press. 
 
Holm, C., Langsted, L. B., & Seehausen, J. (2011). Establishing Proactive Auditor 
Responsibilities in Relation to Fraud: The Role of the Courts and Professional Bodies 
in Denmark. International Journal of Auditing, no-no. 
 
Suyanto 
 
153 
 
Humphrey, C., Turley, S., & Moizer, P. (1993). Protecting against Detection: The Case 
of Auditors and Fraud? Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 6(1), 36-
62. 
 
IAI. (1998). Pernyataan Standar Audit (PSA) No. 70: Pertimbangan Kecurangan dalam Audil 
Laporan Keuangan (Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit). 
 
IAI. (2009) Kolom IFRS: Mana Yang Menjadi Prioritas?  : Vol. 20. Akuntan Indonesia. 
        Jakarta: IAI. 
 
IFAC. (2016). International Standards on Auditing (ISA) 240: the Auditor's Responsibilities 
Relating to Fraud in Audit of Financial Statements.  
 
IFAC. (2010). Basis of ISA Adoption by Jurisdiction IFAC. 
 
Kaminski, K. A., Wetzel, T. S., & Guan, L. (2004). Can financial ratios detect 
fraudulent financial reporting? Managerial Auditing Journal, 19(1), 15-28. 
 
Kirkos, E., Spathis, C., & Manolopoulos, Y. (2007). Data Mining techniques for the detection 
of fraudulent financial statements. Expert Systems with Applications, 32(4), 995-1003. 
 
KPMG. (2003). KPMG Fraud Survey 2003: KPMG Forensic. 
 
Kreutzfeldt, R. W., & Wallace, W. A. (1986). Error Characteristics in Audit Populations: Their 
Profile and Relationship to Environmental Factors. Auditing, 6(1), 20. 
 
Lisa M, V. (2010). The mediated effect of SAS No. 99 and Sarbanes–Oxley officer 
certification on jurors’ evaluation of auditor liability. Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, 29(6), 559-577. 
Loebbecke, J. K., Eining, M. M., & Willingham, J. J. (1989). Auditors' Experience with 
Material Irregularities: Frequency, Nature, and Detectability. [Article]. Auditing, 9(1), 
1. 
 
Mock, T. J., & Turner, J. L. (2005). Auditor Identification of Fraud Risk Factors and 
their Impact on Audit Programs. International Journal of Auditing, 9(1), 59-77. 
 
Nierstrasz, J. C. (2008). In the shadow of the company: the VOC (Dutch East India Company) 
and its servants in the period of its decline (1740-1796). Doctoral Thesis, Leiden 
University. 
 
Palmrose, Z.-V. (1988). 1987 Competitive Manuscript Co-Winner: An Analysis of 
Auditor Litigation and Audit Service Quality. The Accounting Review, 63(1), 55-73. 
 
Persons, O. S. (1995). Using Financial Statement Data To Identify Factors Associated With 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting. Journal Of Applied Business Research, 11(3), 38-46. 
 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. (2005). Global Economic Crime Survey 2005. 
 
The Indonesian Journal of Accounting Research – May, Vol. 19 , No.2 , 2016 
154 
 
Ramos, M. (2003). Auditors’ Responsibility for Fraud Detection. Journal of 
Accountancy, January. 
 
Sarna, D. E. Y. (2010). History of Greed: Financial Fraud from Tulip Mania to Bernie  
       Madoff. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
 
Schwartz, K. B., & Menon, K. (1985). Auditor Switches by Failing Firms. The 
Accounting Review, 60(2), 248-261 
 
Shelton, S. W., Whittington, O. R., & Landsittel, D. (2001). Auditing Firms' Fraud 
Risk Assessment Practices. Accounting Horizons, 15(1), 19-33. 
 
Skousen, C. J. (2008). An Empirical Investigation of the Relevance And Predictive Ability of 
the SAS 99 Fraud Risk Factors Doctoral Thesis, Oklahoma State University 
 
Stice, J. D. (1991). Using Financial and Market Information to Identify Pre-Engagement 
Factors Associated with Lawsuits against Auditors. The Accounting Review, 66(3), 516-
533. 
 
Vermeer, T. (2003). The impact of SAS No. 82 on an auditor’s tolerance of 
earnings management. Journal of Forensic Accounting, 5, 21-34. 
 
Young, B. (2005). Related-party transactions: Why they matter and what is disclosed. 
The Corporate Governance Advisor, 13(4), 1-7. 
 
Zabihollah, R. (2005). Causes, consequences, and deterence of financial statement fraud. 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 16(3), 277-298 
Suyanto 
 
155 
 
Appendix 
 
 
Fraud Risk Factors Excerpted from ISA 240 Relating to Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
 
Pressures Opportunities  
Rationalizat
ions 
1. Financial stability or profitability is 1. The nature of the industry or the - 
Communication, 
implementation, support, 
threatened by economic, industry, or entity’s operations provide  
 or enforcement of the 
entity's values or  
entity operating conditions. opportunities to engage in fraudulent  
ethical standards by 
management, or the 
- High degree of competition or market financial reporting that can arise from  
communication of 
inappropriate values or 
saturation, accompanied by declining the following:  
ethical standards that are 
not effective.  
margins. -  Significant related-party transactions - 
Nonfinancial 
management’s excessive 
- High vulnerability to rapid changes, such not in the ordinary course of business or  
participation in or 
preoccupation with the 
as changes in technology, product with related entities not audited or  
 selection of accounting 
policies or the  
obsolescence, or interest rates. audited by another firm.  
determination of 
significant estimates. 
- Significant declines in customer demand -  A strong financial presence or ability to 
-  Known history of violations 
of securities 
and increasing business failures in either dominate a certain industry sector that  
laws or other laws and 
regulations, or 
the industry or overall economy. allows the entity to dictate terms or  
claims against the entity, 
its senior 
- Operating losses making the threat of conditions to suppliers or customers that  management or those 
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charged with 
bankruptcy, foreclosure, or hostile may result in inappropriate or non-  
governance alleging fraud 
or violations of 
 takeover imminent.  arm’s-length transactions.  laws and regulations. 
- Recurring negative cash flows from -  Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses 
-  Excessive interest by 
management in 
operations or an inability to generate based on significant estimates that  
maintaining or increasing 
the entity’s 
cash flows from operations while involve subjective judgments or  
 stock price or earnings 
trend. 
reporting earnings and earnings growth. uncertainties that are difficult to 
-  The practice by management 
of 
- Rapid growth or unusual profitability corroborate.  
committing to analysts, 
creditors, and 
especially compared to that of other -  Significant, unusual, or highly complex  
 other third parties to 
achieve aggressive or 
 companies in the same industry.  transactions, especially those close to  unrealistic forecasts. 
- New accounting, statutory, or regulatory period end that poses difficult "substance  
-  Management failing to 
remedy known 
requirements. over form” questions.  
significant deficiencies in 
internal control 
2. Excessive pressure exists for -  Significant operations located or   on a timely basis.  
management to meet the requirements  conducted across international borders  
-  An interest by management 
in employing 
or expectations of third parties due to in jurisdictions where differing business  
inappropriate means to 
minimize reported 
the following: environments and cultures exist.  
earnings for tax-motivated 
reasons. 
- Profitability or trend level expectations  
-  Low morale among senior 
management. 
of investment analysts, institutional    
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investors, significant creditors, or other - Use of business intermediaries for 
-  The owner-manager makes 
no distinction 
external parties (particularly  which there appears to be no clear 
between personal and 
business 
expectations that are unduly aggressive   business justification.  transactions. 
or unrealistic), including expectations - Significant bank accounts or subsidiary 
-  Dispute between 
shareholders in a closely 
created by management in, for example,   or branch operations in tax-haven  held entity. 
overly optimistic press releases or annual  jurisdictions for which there appears to 
-  Recurring attempts by 
management to 
report messages.  be no clear business justification. 
justify marginal or 
inappropriate 
- Need to obtain additional debt or equity 2. The monitoring of management is not 
accounting on the basis of 
materiality. 
financing to stay competitive – including effective as a result of the following: 
-  The relationship between 
management and 
financing of major research and - Domination of management by a single 
the current or predecessor 
auditor is 
development or capital expenditures.  person or small group (in a non-owner- 
strained, as exhibited by the 
following: 
- Marginal ability to meet exchange listing  managed business) without 
Frequent disputes with the 
current or 
requirements or debt repayment or other   compensating controls.  
predecessor auditor on 
accounting, 
 debt covenant requirements.  -  Oversight by those charged with 
 auditing, or reporting 
matters.  
- Perceived or real adverse effects of   governance over the financial reporting 
 Unreasonable demands on 
the auditor, 
 reporting poor financial results on   the process and internal control is not  such as unrealistic 
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time constraints 
 significant pending transactions, such as   effective.  
regarding the 
completion of the 
audit 
business combinations or contract 3. There is a complex or unstable 
or the issuance of the 
auditor’s report. 
awards. organizational structure, as evidenced 
Restrictions on the auditor 
that 
3. Information available indicates that the by the following: 
inappropriately limit 
access to people 
personal financial situation of - Difficulty in determining the 
or information or the 
ability to 
management or those charged with  organization or individuals that have 
communicate 
effectively with those 
governance is threatened by the entity's   controlling interest in the entity.  
charged with 
governance. 
financial performance arising from the - Overly complex organizational structure 
Domineering management 
behavior in 
following:  involving unusual legal entities or 
dealing with the 
auditor, especially 
- Significant financial interests in the    managerial lines of authority.  involving attempts to 
influence the 
 entity. -  High turnover of senior management,  scope of the auditor’s 
work or the 
- Significant portions of their 
 
legal counsel, or those charged with  selection or 
continuance of 
personnel 
compensation (for example, bonuses, 
 
governance.  assigned to or 
consulted on the audit 
stock options, and earn-out 4. Internal control components are  engagement. 
arrangements) being contingent upon deficient as a result of the following:  
Suyanto 
 
159 
 
achieving aggressive targets for stock  -  Inadequate monitoring of controls,  
price, operating results, financial 
position, or cash flow. 
 
- Personal guarantees of debts of the entity. 
 
4. There is excessive pressure on management or 
operating personnel to meet financial targets 
established by those charged with governance, 
including sales or profitability incentive goals. 
  
including automated controls and controls over 
interim financial 
 
 
- reporting (where external reporting 
is 
required 
High turnover rates or employment  
of accounting, internal audit, or information 
technology staff  that are not effective 
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Intentionally Blank 
 
